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1.

Did the trial court err in admitting defendant's

son's statements that defendant made him steal merchandise as
nonhearsay or under exceptions to the hearsay rule?
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's

conviction of retail theft?
3*

Was the evidence sufficient to establish that

defendant participated in retail theft of merchandise valued over
$1000# a second-degree felony?

iv

76-6-602•

Retail theft, acts constituting•

A person commits the offense of retail theft when he
knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention
of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession, use or benefit
of such merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label,
price tag, marking, indicia of value or any
other markings which aid in determining value
of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale, in a retail mercantile
establishment and attempts to purchase such
merchandise personally or in consort with
another at less than the retail value of such
merchandise; or
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment from the container
in or on which such merchandise is displayed
to any other container with the intention of
depriving the merchant of the retail value of
such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of
depriving the merchant of the retail value of
the merchandise; or
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment
with the intent of depriving the merchant of
the possession, use or benefit of such cart*
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followed them up the

In

escalator and watched while defendant, who held a brown "Wolfe's"
sack with some object in it, paced in front of the escalator and
the boys left in separate directions (R. 129-30).

After 2-3

minutes, the boys returned with a large, plastic ZCMI bag (R.
130-31).

Defendant placed the doll and the Wolfe's parcel inside

the ZCMI bag and handed it to the youngest boy (R. 132). The
boys left again and returned after a few moments.

Then all three

exited the third floor on the escalator (R. 132).
Ms. Skollingsberg called for more help and then
followed the trio to the second floor where they wandered around
for about five minutes (R. 133-34).

The trio again rode the

escalator to the third floor where the boys dispersed and then
returned to defendant (R. 134-35) • Then the youngest boy
disappeared and defendant and the older boy got on the escalator
(R. 135). Ms. Skollingsberg heard defendant tell the oldest boy,
as they rode to the second floor, that the other boy was lost and
they might need help to find him (R. 135).
Once they arrived on the second floor, defendant and
the older boy exited to the parking terrace (R. 136) . There Ms.
Skollingsberg saw the youngest boy talking to Stephen Hutchinson
(R. 136). Mr. Hutchinson, whose wife works for ZCMI, had been
asked to follow the boy by another store employee (R. 136, 164,
191).
At one point during the various trips up and down the
escalator, Judith Hansen, the other store employee, heard
defendant tell bis sons to take what they had and hide it or
"ditch" it in the toy department (R. 163, 169). After hearing
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David Bailey that he thought his son took something from the
sound room (R. 171)• Defendant said he would get his son and
return him to the department (R. 171) • Mr. Bailey thought this
seemed suspicious, checked the displays and discovered that a
Sony Bandi Camcorder was missing (R. 172). Mr. Bailey saw
defendant in his department one to two hours earlier but had not
spoken to defendant (R. 175).
Neither defendant nor the boys had receipts for the
doll or video equipment (R. 142). The doll sold for $36 (R.
137).

The video camera and recorder sold as a package for $1849

on sale and $1979 regular price (R. 173-74).

The video equipment

was not priced or sold separately (R. 180-81).

I.

The trial court properly admitted as non-hearsay

statements by defendant's child that defendant made him steal
merchandise.

When the boy made these statements, he had been

recruited by defendant to transfer and/or conceal ZCMI
merchandise and was acting as defendant's agent.
Furthermore, the statements were also admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were excited
utterances, statements of present-sense impressions or statements
of the child's state of mind expressing his motive to shoplift.
II and III.

The evidence sufficiently linked defendant

to the stolen merchandise to establish that defendant committed
retail theft and that the merchandise was worth more than $1000.
This evidence revealed defendant's use of his children to conceal
transfer and carry away ZCMI merchandise without paying the
retail price.
-4-

ABGUMEfll
£fiUULX
DEFENDANTS SON'S INCULPATORY STATEMENT
HAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
The trial court admitted statements made by defendant's
son at the time of his apprehension over defendant's hearsay
objection.

The court's ruling was based upon Utah R. Evid.

801(d)(2)(D) (Supp. 1986) that the boy's statements:
want to do this.
of defendant.

"I didn't

My Dad made me do this." were those of an agent

The court found , therefore, that the statements

were not hearsay.
On appeal, defendant argues that his child was not his
agent but that even if he was, the statements were not within the
scope of his agency nor made during the existence of the
relationship and, consequently, they were inadmissible hearsay.
Defendant also appears to claim that his son was not a coconspirator or that, even if he was, the statements were not
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they were not made
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The

trial court, however, correctly admitted the statements under
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and as developed below, defendant inaccurately
confuses the •agent" rule with the •conspirator" rule.
Utah adopted the Federal Rule 801 verbatim.

For this

reason, the Utah courts look to interpretation of federal rules
as guidance for interpretation of the Utah rule.
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986).

]Stfl£e_Y*

GEBY*

Federal courts do not blur rules

801(d)(2)(D) and 801(d)(2)(E) into a single non-hearsay rule.
See 4 Neinstein t Berger, HfiinfitfiinlS-fixidfiDCS 801-233 to 801-23 5

5

(13th ed. 1985) •
GL&XI

While both the Utah Supreme Court, see £££££_£.•.

717 P.2d at 1316, and federal courts have said that the

conspirator rule is based upon agency theory, that reference is
to traditional agency theory that required the statements to have
been within the scope of the agent's authority*

Defendant

mistakenly expands this expression of a limitation on the
conspirator rule to create a similar limitation on the agent rule
as it currently exists.

Rule 801(d)(2)(D), however, is not

limited to statements that were authorized by the principal as
defendant suggests.

£££ 4 Hfiinsifiiulfi at 801-219.

All that is

required for admission of statements of an agent made during the
agency relationship is that they jLfilaifi to a matter within the
scope of the agency.

4 HfiinfitfiiDlfi at 801-222.

This Court

should not, therefore, apply cases relating to the conspirator
rule to determine the contours of the agency rule as defendant
urges it do do.
As previously stated, the trial court properly grounded
admission of the child's statements on the agent rule,
801(d)(2)(D).

That rule provides:

(d) . . . A statement is not hearsay if
. . .

(2) . . . The statement is offered against a
party and is . . . (D) a statement by his
agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship. • .
Prom the evidence recited above, it was clear that this child was
recruited by his father to commit retail theft and that when the
child made the statements in issue, they related to his acts of
thett and that the agency relationship still existed.

6-

Federal courts have admitted statements of agents in
similar situations.

For example, in flnitfijLStfltfifi-X-i-SuoiDfilfi,

598 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1979), a city councilman recruited a
utility contractor to solicit kick-backs for him.

The

contractor's statements were admitted against the councilman
under 801(d)(2)(D) because the government took the position that
the contractor was not a co-conspirator and that 801(d)(2)(E) did
not apply.
Proof of the agency relationship must, of course, be
proved by evidence other than the alleged agent's statements.
Uni£fid_Sl;fl±£S_YA-3flI}£S# 766 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1985).

This

evidence must be substantial, however, proof of an agency
relationship need not be by a preponderance,

Id. ciiina I2oi££d

SiatfiS-X^ElflLfifi# 679 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1982), ££tt.
dfiDifidf 459 U.S. 1148 (1983).
The evidence of an agency relationship between
defendant and his son is substantial in this case.

As recited

more fully above, defendant directed his sons in a scheme to
remove merchandise from the ZCMI store by bringing it to him and
placing it inside a ZCMI store sack.

Although there is no

testimony of statements made by defendant to his sons directing
them to steal merchandise, defendant's actions establish that
this was what was happening.

Based upon this substantial

evidence, the trial court was correct in admitting the statements
as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).

Furthermore, this Court

should not disturb the trial court's decision to admit alleged
hearsay absent an abuse of discretion.
766 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1985).
•7-

UDii£d-jLtfli£S_X*_iflDfi£#

No such abuse occurred here.

Moreover, the state did not and does not now advance
the theory that the evidence was admissible as non-hearsay as an
admission of a co-conspirator.

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) requires that

the statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy*

It

cannot be seriously asserted that this child's exclamation
inculpating his father in his criminal activity was made in
furtherance of the criminal joint venture. jSfifi S£ai£-.JU_filAX#
717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986).

Rather, the state chooses to rely on

Rule 801(d)(2)(D), a statement by an agent, as the basis for
admission of the child's statements*
Even if this Court finds that the statements were
hearsay, they were still admissible under at least tnree
exceptions to the hearsay rule*

Admittedly, the trial court did

not apply these three hearsay exceptions nor did the state
advance two of these theories at trial.

This Court may

nevertheless atfirm the trial court's decision to admit the
evidence on any proper ground, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling.fiiaifi-XA-Srsy#717 P.2d
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).

The lower court's ruling on the

admissibility of the evidence should not be disturbed where it
was not clearly in error.

Id.

In this case, there are three

other theories upon which the evidence was properly admitted and,
consequently, the trial court did not err in its admission.
First, the child's statements were admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were excited
utterances under Rule 803(2).

Here, the child exclaimed to an

adult who pursued him outside the store while he carried stolen

8-

merchandise that his father made him steal the merchandise*

At

the time the statements were made, the child was under the stress
of excitement from being discovered and pursued as a shoplifter
and the statements were directly related to his criminal
activities.

They were spontaneous and could not have been "the

result of fabrication; intervening actions, or the exercise of
choice or judgment."

S.t£i£_:su_Kay.fc££, 6 84 P.2d 63, 6 4 (Utah

1984) quoting, &QhnSt>Qn-X+-Qbla i 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 194
(1969).

JSfiS AlSfl ££fli£_X*-bcMiilAD# 588 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah

1978).
Second, the child's statements also qualified as
exceptions to the hearsay rule because they were statements
explaining an event made during the event or immediately
thereafter under Rule 803(1).

The rule provides the following

exception:
A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition or
immediately thereafter.
The crucial question here is whether the declaration was part of
a continuous mental process influenced by the event described or
explained.

See 4 Weinstein & Berger, JSfiinSifiiD«fi_fiYidfiD£fi

§803(1)[Dl] (1985).

This is frequently referred to as the

continuity of event analysis.

Application of this rule assumes

that the statements were highly reliable because they were
simultaneous with the child's capture; resulting in no memory
problem and "little or no time for calculated misstatement" by
the child.

4 KfiiDfitfiiDlfi-BxidfiDCfi at 803-74.

£££ Aififi Halted

£*Aififi_YA_E£fl£flCk# 654 P.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on
other grounds 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982).
-9-

Finally, the statements also qualified for admission
under 803(3) as
[a] statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health). . .
This exception is really a specialized application of Rule
803(1), Fed. R. Evid. 803, advisory committee notes. Much of the
justification for one applies to the other.

Again the crucial

question is the continuity of event analysis.
Here, the child's statements related to his motive to
commit the criminal acts for which he had just been apprehended.
He was explaining why he was found crouching behind a car holding
stolen merchandise.

As such, the explanation should be admitted

as an exception to the hearsay rule.
£QJLBT_iI
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT.
Defendant urges this Court to overturn his conviction
of retail theft on the theory that the evidence adduced at trial
was insufficient to establish all of the elements of the crime.
A review of the record reveals, however, that based upon the
standard of review articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, there
was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is strict:
When there is any evidence, including
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
it, from which findings of all the requisite
10-

elements of the crime can be reasonably made,
(the] inquiry stops and [the Court]
sustainls] the verdict.
S*ai£_XA-.M2ClfliD# 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985).

There was

evidence presented at trial supporting each element of the
offense which this Court must assume the jury believed, £Jta££_JU
fi£H£ll# 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982); SiflJt£-X*_BflDC3dar case no.
860243-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App., decided May 13, 1987).

That

evidence revealed that defendant directed his children on
November 23, 19 86 in a scheme to obtain a video camera/recorder
and a "Cabbage Patch" doll from the ZCMI store in the Cottonwood
Mall without paying for them.
The children were observed meeting with defendant and
exchanging packages with him several times on different floors of
the store.

Defendant placed a "Cabbage Patch" doll into a white

ZCMI bag and returned it to one of the boys who was later
apprehended outside the store with the doll (R. 131-32, 202).
The boy told his captor "I didn't want to do this.
me do this."

My dad made

(R. 201).

ZCMI employees also saw defendant holding a brown,
plastic "Wolfe's" bag containing some object and watched as
defendant placed this bag inside the ZCMI bag along with the doll
(R. 132). The Wolfe's bag, which contained a video camera
belonging to ZCMI, was later discovered on the front seat of
defendant's car (R. 140*41, 185).
At one point, defendant told the boys to ditch or hide
what they had in the toy department (R. 163, 169). One boy later
led a store employee to the toy department where he pointed out
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the recorder portion of the missing video equipment hidden under
a display, completely concealed from view (R. 138-40)*

Neither

defendant nor the boys possessed receipts for any of these items
(R. 142).
Defendant argued at trial and claims again on appeal
that his children, or one of them, was the shoplifter and that
defendant was unaware of this activity.

Nevertheless, the

evidence and the inferences that can fairly be drawn from it
suggest otherwise.

The jury could have believed that defendant

said he thought his child had stolen something and continued to
disbelieve that defendant intended to prevent his child's success
at removing the video equipment from the store*

At the time

defendant made this statement, store employes had followed him up
and down the escalator and from department to department.

The

jury could have concluded that defendant discovered he was being
followed and attempted to cast blame on his child rather than
vice versa.

The jury was not required to accept defendant's

contradictory interpretation of the evidence,

Mflncad£# slip op.

at 1.
Moreover, the jury could reasonably have concluded that
8 year old children who are shoplifting without their parent's
knowledge do not simply place the stolen merchandise in plain
view on the front seat of their parent's car.

Interestingly, it

was defendant who provided the police officer with the keys to
his car, which was locked (R. 185, 198-88).

There was no

evidence that the children had accessed the keys with or without
defendant's knowledge.

-i ?-

Finally, the 8 year old boy's exclamation implicating
defendant adds credence to the evidence that defendant committed
the crime charged.

Even if defendant were not the person who

physically removed the items from the store, Utah law provides
for conviction of a person "who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person • • • " engaging
in criminal conduct.

Utah Code Ann. 576-2-202 (1978) .*

Furthermore, § 76-6-60 2(1) provides that a person who ££U£££
merchandise to be carried away or transferred with the intent to
retain it or with intent to permanently deprive the merchant of
its user benefit or possession without paying for it is guilty of
retail theft.

Defendant unquestionably caused all of the items

in question to be either carried away or transferred by the
children.

Defendant's intent to retain the items or permanently

deprive ZCMI of them must be inferred from all of the
circumstances described above and was reasonably found by the
jury.

This Court should, therefore, affirm defendant's

conviction.

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED RETAIL THEFT OF
MERCHANDISE WORTH MORE THAN $1000.
Classification of the offense of retail theft is
controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978).
Ann. § 76-6-606 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
1

JSfifi Utah Code

Defendant was convicted of a

The jury was not instructed on this statute, however, the lack
of such an instruction does not appear fatal where Utah law
clearly creates culpability for such activity and where the
retail theft statute, S 76-6-602(1), incorporates a similar
policy.
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second-degree felony under S 76-6-412(a)(i) because the value of
the property exceeded $1000. Defendant insists that he should
not have been convicted of a felony at all because the only
property connected to him was the dollf valued at $36, and theft
of the doll alone was a class B misdemeanor under S 76-6-412(d).
Much of defendants argument centers on whether there
was sufficient evidence linking defendant to the video camera and
the recorder*

This argument is really an extension of the

argument in his Point II as defendant does not challenge the
evidence of the value of each item in question.

Defendant merely

reasserts his defense that, if anything was taken, his son was
responsible rather than himself.

As established in Point II,

above, there is more than sufficient evidence linking defendant
to all of these items.

Defendant placed a "Wolfe's" bag that

contained an object inside a larger ZCMI bag along with the doll
and gave it to his son.

Later, Officer Kartchner found the

Wolfe's bag, containing the video camera, on the front seat of
defendant's car where defendant's son told Ms. Skollingsberg it
was located.

Defendant's son was apprehended outside the store

with the doll.

Defendant told his son to hide or ditch something

in the toy department.

The boy led Ms. Skollingsberg to the

video recorder which was hidden under a display in the toy
department.

These facts sufficiently established a link between

defendant and the merchandise to sustain his conviction.

The

only remaining issue is whether these facts also established
defendant's intent to permanently deprive ZCMI of the video
recorder without paying for it.

-1i-

Defendant argues that intent to permanently deprive was
not established because the video recorder never left the store
and because defendant told a store employee that he thought his
son might have taken something.

Defendant cites an Illinois

case, EfiQPlg«x.aJEfllflfll£S* 328 N.E.2d 210 (111. App. 1975), for
the proposition that the theft of the video recorder was
incomplete, apparently until removed from the store.

The

£dl9£I£S court affirmed a conviction for attempted theft where
merchandise was concealed in a bag, not paid for, but not removed
from the store because the suspect was apprehended inside the
store.

While the Illinois theft statute in effect in 1975 was

not included in the text of the opinion, it is apparent that
asportation was required to complete the offense at that time.
In contrast, the Utah retail theft statute does not require
asportation.

Section 76-6-602(1) states:

A person commits the offense of retail theft
when he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention
of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possesion, use or benefit
of such merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise; • . .
While a person who removed (carried away) items from the premises
would clearly have committed retail theft, a person who conceals
or transfers merchandise within the store with the intent to
retain it or the intent to permanently deprive (or caused its
concealment or transfer) has also committed retail theft.
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Here,

defendant caused the transfer and concealment of the video
recorder.

His intent can only be inferred from the circumstances

surrounding the events.

The jury must have inferred that

defendant either intended to retain the recorder when it was
transferred from its original location, or to permanently deprive
ZCMI of the recorder when he told his son to transfer and conceal
it or when he participated in the removal of the camera, without
which the recorder was useless to ZCMI since these items sold as
a unit.
Defendant's argument to the contrary rests on his
assertion that the jury must have believed that defendant's
statement to Mr. Bailey about his son having taken something
absolved defendant of any guilt.

Regardless of defendant's

claim, this Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict.
1.

SJtai£-XA-MQDCfldflr slip op. at

The interpretation of this evidence that is most favorable to

the verdict is that defendant was trying to deflect suspicion
from himself to his son after defendant discovered that ZCMI
security employees were following him throughout the store.
Neither the jury nor this Court must accept defendant's version
of the facts. Id.
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Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State requests
this Court to atfirm defendant's conviction.
DATED t h i s @jh day of June, 1987.
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